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Quo Vadis EU Investment Law and Policy? The
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Promotion of EU Rules
Szilárd GÁSPÁR-SZILÁGYI*
Following the Lisbon changes to the EU’s Common Commercial Policy (CCP), the path was
set for the EU to conclude international agreements that cover the protection of foreign direct
investment and to participate in international investment law (IIL) as a creator and promoter of
norms. Nonetheless, recent political and legal events might jeopardize the workability and
coherence of the emerging EU investment law and policy. In light of this, this article first aims
to contribute to the existing discussion on the ways in which the EU can export its norms
externally and provides a conceptual understanding of the often-used term of ‘convergence’ and
how the EU might induce some level of convergence of IIL norms. Secondly, the article has a
sceptical undertone as to whether the EU can become an IIL rule-promoter and whether it can
induce some level of convergence of IIL norms. Whilst the possibility is there, the multilateral and
diffused nature of investment law, the presence of strong international actors with their own
agendas, the domestic contestation of investor-state dispute settlement, and the important role of
the Court of Justice might hamper the EU’s attempt to become a major influencer of IIL norms
1 INTRODUCTION
The EU is a relatively new player in the field of International Investment Law
(IIL). Following the Lisbon amendments to the EU’s Common Commercial
Policy (CCP),1 the path was set for the EU to conclude international agreements
that covered the protection of foreign direct investment2 and to participate in IIL
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1 TFEU, Art. 207(1). See A. Dimopoulos, The Effects of the Lisbon Treaty on the Principles and Objectives of
the Common Commercial Policy, 15 Eur. Foreign Aff. Rev. 153–170 (2010); C-H. Wu, Foreign Direct
Investment as Common Commercial Policy: EU External Economic Competence After Lisbon, in EU External
Relations Law and Policy in the Post-Lisbon Era 375–400 (P. J. Cardwell ed., Springer-Asser 2012); The
Anatomy of the (Invisible) EU Model BIT Marc Bungenberg and August Reinisch (Guest Editors, Special Issue),
15(3–4) J. World Inv. & Trade, Special Issue (2014).
2 In the pre-Lisbon era, the EU, together with its Member States, concluded the Energy Charter Treaty,
which includes an ISDS mechanism.
as a creator and promoter of norms. Nonetheless, recent political and legal events
might jeopardize the workability and coherence of the emerging EU investment
law and policy.
With the above in mind, this article looks at the ways in which the EU can
use/has used its Article 207 TFEU powers to promote its own rules and values in
IIL, either bilaterally or multilaterally. It asks the question whether the EU can
become a major IIL norm creator or promoter. As a response, the article argues
that recent external and internal political, as well as legal constraints, call into
question the EU’s ability to act as a rule-promoter in IIL. This in turn can result in
low levels of convergence of IIL norms towards EU norms or towards general
norms, inspired by EU norms.
Regarding the structure, section 2 clarifies some of the terms used in the analysis
and provides a short overview of the various ways in which the EU promotes its
norms externally. Section 3 then looks at the current state of EU investment law and
policy, considering various internal and external factors that influence the EU’s
ability to become a promoter of rules in IIL and its ability to achieve some level
of convergence of IIL norms. Section 4 focuses on concluding remarks.
2 HOW DOES THE EU PROMOTE ITS NORMS EXTERNALLY?
2.1 CLARIFYING SOME OF THE TERMS
In 2002, prior to the Lisbon amendments, Manners identified five ‘core’ norms on
which the EU rests: peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law, and human rights. To
this, he added four ‘minor’ norms: social solidarity, anti-discrimination, sustainable
development, and good governance.3 Article 3.5 TFEU now codifies these
‘norms’ and lays down a double constitutional obligation for the EU in its relations
with the outside world. Firstly, the EU shall ‘uphold’ and ‘promote’ its values and
interests. Secondly, it shall ‘contribute’ to the achievement of major global objec-
tives, such as peace, security, solidarity, sustainable development, free and fair
trade, the protection of human rights, etc. From the text of the article one can
deduce that these obligations cover all types of EU ‘relations’ with the outside
world, be they the setting-out of policy objectives, the creation of new treaty-
based rules and institutions, or actual, on the ground operations. Furthermore, they
require the EU to act in a positive manner, either by actively encouraging the
usage and dissemination of EU values (‘promote’) externally or by bringing about
the achievement of major global objectives (‘contribute’).
3 J. Manners, Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?, 40(2) J. Com. Mkt. Stud. 235–258,
242–243 (2002).
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The article restricts itself to the ways in which the EU can affect norms
externally, either by promoting its own norms or by contributing to the creation of
common norms. It uses a narrow understanding of the term ‘norm’, in the sense of
norms found in hard law instruments such as international treaties, international
decisions, etc. The dissemination of norms via soft law instruments will not be the
focal point of the analysis. Furthermore, in the upcoming sections I will use the
terms ‘norms’ and ‘rules’ interchangeably.
Moving on, international actors that wish to engage externally with each
other are faced with a diverse set of legal rules. They can opt to keep the
diversity of the rules between them as they are, or more often, to bring them
closer together. Matta argues that international actors wishing to solve problems
created by legal diversity can choose various options. These options can be
placed on a scale that starts with the diversity of rules, continues towards
approximation, convergence, harmonization, and ends in the unification of the
rules.4 When looking at these processes, one must take into consideration the
context in which they take place, the instruments used in the process, and the
elements that need approximation.5 For example, the recent EU-Ukraine
Association Agreement6 is set in the broader context of the European
Neighbourhood Policy (‘context’), which aims to create a circle of like-minded
states surrounding the EU, by bringing lasting political, economic and judicial
reforms in the partner countries (‘instruments’), through the approximation of
laws, standards or practices (‘elements’).
There is no clear line separating the concepts of convergence, approximation
and harmonization. There is a lively academic debate on the exact meaning of
these individual concepts.7 The article, however, does not wish to engage with this
debate. Instead, it opts for the concept of convergence, in the sense of two or more
things coming together. It also differentiates between two types of rule convergence,
explained below: type A and type B convergence.
Type A convergence, as illustrated in Figure 1, implies an asymmetric move-
ment; the norms of the ‘weaker’ party will move closer to the norms of the
‘stronger’ party.8 For the EU this means that the norms of a partner country,
4 A. Matta, Differentiating the Methods of Acquis Export: The Case of the Eastern Partners and Russia, in
Legislative Approximation and Application of EU Law in the Eastern Neighbourhood of the European Union.
Towards a Common Regulatory Space? 21–45, 24–26 (P. Van Elsuwege & R. Petrov eds, Routledge
2014).
5 Ibid., at 25.
6 Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and
Ukraine, of the other part (2014).
7 See Matta, supra n. 4, at 25–28 and his references to other authors.
8 ‘Strength’ here is not defined in military terms, but refers to the size of the market, economic strength,
etc. The EU can use the size of its market as a bargaining tool in negotiations with countries who want
to get access to that market.
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such as Vietnam or Canada, will move closer to the more authoritative ‘EU
norms’. Type A convergence will mostly happen in the bilateral context, in
which there is a power imbalance in favour of the EU. This does not mean that
the partner country cannot become a norm-setter when concluding an agree-
ment with a different country. For example, Canada can be seen as the weaker
party in the context of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
(CETA), but the stronger party in case of the Canada-Benin investment
agreement.
One could also debate whether Type A convergence in some cases might
result in ‘norm imposition’ by the stronger party. Nevertheless, this type of
convergence is easier to measure. For example, one can look at whether the
stronger party uses its own model agreement as a template for the conclusion of
the international agreement with the weaker party. If the resulting agreement
follows the stronger party’s model, then it is evident that the weaker party will
follow the norms of the stronger one.
In investment law, the US or Canada often use model bilateral investment
treaties (BITs) as a basis for the conclusion of similarly/identically worded BITs
with third countries from Latin America or Africa, among others.9 Closer to
home, the EU/EC had used the similarly/identically worded Europe
Agreements to induce normative changes in the candidate Central and
Eastern European countries. However, an ‘express’ model agreement, desig-
nated as such, does not necessarily have to exist. For example, in the first years
of its investment policy the EU Commission had expressly renounced the idea
of a ‘one-size-fits-all’ model for international investment agreements (IIAs).10
The reason was that the EU had to take into account ‘each specific negotiating
context’ and the ‘interests of [EU] stakeholders as well as the level of devel-
opment’ of the partner countries.11 Nonetheless, several years later some aca-
demics had argued that an ‘invisible’ model EU BIT exists.12 A good example
for this is how the model Investment Court System (ICS) proposed during the
negotiations of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)
found its way into the CETA with Canada and the EU-Vietnam free trade
9 See US Model BIT (2004, 2012); Canadian Model Foreign Investment Protection Agreement (FIPA,
2004). The Canadian FIPA was used as a model for a string of new agreements with African countries
(Benin, Tanzania, Cameroon, Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, Cote d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, and Guinea). See
R. Willard & S. Morreau, The Canadian Model BIT – A Step on the Right Direction for Canadian
Investment in Africa? (2016), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2015/07/18/the-canadian-model-bit-
a-step-in-the-right-direction-for-canadian-investment-in-africa/ (accessed 9 Apr. 2018).
10 See European Commission Communication, Towards a Comprehensive European International Investment
Policy 6, COM (2010) 343 final (7 July 2010), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/july/
tradoc_146307.pdf (accessed 9 Apr. 2018).
11 Ibid.
12 See Special Issue, supra n. 1.
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agreement (FTA). Furthermore, the EU Commission renegotiated the recently
split EU-Singapore FTA to include the ICS model in the Investment
Protection Agreement.13 The Commission’s shift to an ‘invisible model BIT’
is a result of the contestation of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) in
several EU Member States. This translated into the need to ensure that all new
EU trade agreements with investment chapters meet certain basic requirements
demanded by civil society, such as increased transparency, the protection of the
host State’s right to regulate, or the reform of ISDS mechanisms.
Type B convergence appears in Figure 2. One could even use the term ‘true
convergence’, in the case of which many different norms head towards one
common norm. This type of convergence will mostly occur in the multilateral
setting, where one actor cannot impose its own norms on other actors. The most it
can do is influence the commonly accepted norms. Type B convergence could also
occur in a bilateral setting, between two equal parties that are not willing to follow
the norms imposed by one of them.
In the case of type B convergence, it is also more difficult to measure the
influence of one of the parties. First, the negotiating histories for multilateral
agreements are often incomplete or non-existent. Thus, it is hard to figure out
which party influenced the creation of a specific rule. Second, even if one can
identify one of the parties as the main catalyser behind the adoption of a new set of
rules, the differences between the originally proposed rules and those commonly
agreed upon can be great, thus minimizing the influence of the initiator.
Figure 1 Type A Convergence
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13 European Commission, EU-Singapore Trade and Investment Agreements (Authentic Texts as of Apr.
2018) goo.gl/Ppe8wC http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=961 (accessed 2 July
2018).
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Figure 2 Type B Convergence
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One also needs to look at ‘what’ is converging towards ‘what’. Are various
national/internal norms converging towards an international/supranational norm?-
14 Are several international norms converging towards another international norm?
Alternatively, are national norms in one entity converging towards the national
norms of another entity via an international agreement? In the EU context, Matta
differentiates between the internal approximation of EU Member State norms and
the export of EU norms, achieved for example through legislative approximation
in the partner countries.15 Larik mentions ‘top-down Europeanization’ as a process
‘of national adaptation to the requirements of EU membership’.16 However, these
examples refer to some form of changes brought to the internal norms of EU
Member States, candidate states or the partner countries. The article, on the other
hand, is concerned with international rules/norms and their convergence. In other
words, how can the IIL norms of other countries converge towards IIL norms of the EU, or
how can the EU contribute to the convergence of various IIL norms towards common IIL
norms?
2.2. A MULTITUDE OF EU METHODS
The EU has actively pursued its Article 3.5 TFEU objectives, both bilaterally and
multilaterally.17 It defends and promotes its interests and values in various inter-
national organizations that accept its membership (World Trade Organization,
Food and Agriculture Organization), it exports its norms in preferential trade,
14 E.g. Larik talks about ‘bottom-up Europeanization’, according to which Member States ‘project’ their
national preferences to the EU level. See J. Larik, Foreign Policy Objectives in European Constitutional Law
267 (Oxford University Press 2016).
15 Matta, supra n. 4, at 26 and 34.
16 Larik, supra n. 14, at 266.
17 See M. Cremona, The Union as a Global Actor: Rules, Models and Identity, 41 Common Mkt. L. Rev.
556, 553–573 (2004).
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cooperation or association agreements or, it acts as the galvanizer behind path-
breaking multilateral agreements (Paris Climate Agreement, Rome Statute of the
ICC) or multilateral institutions (UN Ombudsperson). As Cremona notes, the EU
not only acts as a ‘rule generator’, but also as a regional stabilizer (albeit with
limited success in recent years).18
Writing fifteen years ago Manners argued that due to the EU’s unique nature,
its relationship with the outside world should not be seen through the more
traditional, state like models, such as ‘military’19 or ‘civilian power’. Instead, the
EU acts as a ‘normative power’.20 It disseminates its norms through various means.
First, the EU can unintentionally diffuse its norms to other political actors (con-
tagion). The EU can also use various information channels to diffuse its norms
(informational diffusion), it can institutionalize its relationship with a third country
(procedural diffusion), and it can spread its norms via its physical presence in third
countries (overt diffusion). Furthermore, it can use the ‘carrot and stick’ method to
induce EU infused changes in the partner country in exchange of material support
(transference), or it can impact through softer means such as cultural diffusion.21 As
the next sections will illustrate, when it comes to the diffusion of IIL norms, the
first three methods are most adequate. The EU has thus far included its investment
protection standards and the ICS in far-reaching trade and investment agreements
(procedural diffusion) and has published many policy documents on how it seeks to
reform investment law (informational diffusion). It might also happen that in case
of a successful EU ICS model, other countries will follow it (contagion).
It can be argued that in the bilateral setting, the EU mainly promotes Type A
convergence, by making other, predominantly weaker international partners
accept the EU’s norms. This has especially been the case with regard to the
EU’s neighbours. The EU’s network of Partnership and Cooperation
Agreements PCAs and more recently Association Agreements with Deep and
18 Ibid., at 557–560. It is debatable whether in the last six to seven years the EU truly acted as a ‘stabilizer’
in its Neighbourhood. One needs to look at the events that unfolded/are unfolding following the
‘Arab Spring’ or the crisis in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea.
19 Z. Radosavljevic, EU Takes Step Towards Closer Defence Cooperation Euractiv (13 Nov. 2017), http://
www.euractiv.com/section/defence-policy/news/eu-takes-step-towards-closer-defence-cooperation/
?utm_term=Autofeed&utm_campaign=Echobox&utm_medium=Social&utm_source=
Facebook#link_time=1510555356 (accessed 9 Apr. 2018).
20 Nonetheless, sociologists have argued that there is a gap between the EU’s self-perception as a
normative power and the perception of the EU by other international actors. See D. Sicurelli, The
EU as a Norm Promoter Through Trade. The Perceptions of Vietnamese Elites, 13 Asia Eur. J. 23–39 (2014).
Kassoti also argues that there is a growing gap between the EU’s rhetoric as a global promoter of values
and realpolitik. See E. Kassoti, Between Völkerrechtsfreundlichkeit and Realpolitik. The EU and Trade
Agreements Covering Occupied Territories, ItYBIL 139–170 (2016). For an overview of the EU’s role as
a ‘normative’ power through the lenses of multiple theories of international relations, see Larik, supra n.
14, Ch. 5.
21 Manners, supra n. 3, at 244–245.
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Comprehensive Trade Agreements, however, do more than just ensure that on
the international level treaties incorporate rules that are predominantly EU
inspired. Some level of convergence has also occurred in the partner countries’
internal legal systems. For example, Petrov and Kalichinenko have demonstrated
that, notwithstanding problems linked to the effectiveness and independence of
the Russian and Ukrainian courts, the EU acquis has permeated the local courts,
thanks to factors such as EU soft law instruments, the provision of technical and
financial assistance, and the CJEU’s favourable interpretation of EU law towards
third country nationals.22
In the multilateral setting, the EU can mainly induce Type B convergence, by
being the galvanizer behind a multilateral effort to create some form of ‘common
norms’. If there is not much opposition from more powerful contracting parties or
a group of ‘like-minded’ states, then the EU can push forward a set of ‘common
norms’ that is greatly influenced by its own norms and values. However, it is also
possible that the opposition of other states will lead to the watering down of many
EU inspired norms. Still, some level of convergence will occur, albeit one with less
EU input. As mentioned, measuring the exact extent of the EU input in the
multilateral setting can be difficult, due to the often-missing negotiating histories.
Furthermore, it is also hard to quantify the importance of the EU’s input in a
commonly accepted set of rules. Nonetheless, the EU-inspired changes brought to
the UN’s Chapter VII sanctions regime is a good example of how the EU can
induce some level of convergence, even in a multilateral organization to which it
cannot formally accede. The Court of Justice’s strong stance in the Kadi case to
protect the right to fair trial, combined with the pressure of the EU and its
Member States have resulted in the creation of the UN Ombudsperson, which
introduces elements of fairness and transparency in the UN sanctions regime.23
3 DID THE EU BITE OFF MORE THAN IT CAN CHEW?
Onewould expect that given the EU’s extensive normative influence in various fields of
international law, it would also have a major influence on IIL norms. This influence
would then lead to some level of convergence of IIL norms, either by making other
treaty parties follow the EU’s norms or by the EU contributing to the creation of a set of
multilateral norms. Section 3 challenges this assumption. It first provides an overview of
22 R. Petrov & P. Kalichenko, The Europeanization of Third Country Judiciaries Through the Application of the
EU Acquis: The Cases of Russia and Ukraine, 60 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 325–353 (2011).
23 J. Wouters & S. Duquet, The United Nations, the European Union and Multilateral Action Against
Terrorism, in EU Management of Global Emergencies 359–395, 390–391 (I. Govaere & S. Poli eds,
Brill-Nijhoff 2014); C. Eckes, EU Restrictive Measures Against Natural and Legal Persons: From
Counterterrorist to Third Country Sanctions, 51 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 869–906, 875–879 (2014).
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the major milestones in the short nine-year existence of the EU’s investment law and
policy, followed by a discussion of several internal and external factors that cast a shadow
over the EU’s potential to induce the convergence of IIL norms.
3.1 THE CUMBERSOME ROAD TO AN EU INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY
One can divide the EU’s post-2009 experiences with investment law and policy
into three major periods up until the writing of this article: an initial period of
modest reform, an intermediate period marked by a push to reform existing IIL
norms, followed by more recent backtracking.
During the initial period, from late 2009 until early 2013, the EUCommission’s
approach to the substantive rules of investment protection and ISDS was neither
radical nor complete continuity was advocated; the overall direction ‘seemed to be
one of modest reform, centring on attempting to fine-tune existing approaches to
ISDS’.24 During this period, the Commission had expressly renounced the idea of a
‘one-size-fits-all’ model for IIAs.25 Furthermore, it was satisfied with twitching
existing IIL norms found in major agreements such as NAFTA. For example, the
Commission’s 2010 Communication ‘towards a comprehensive European interna-
tional investment policy’ includes very general terms26 that are quite favourable to
investors and investments.27 The Communication only succinctly addresses some of
the substantive standards of investment protection, such as national treatment or fair
and equitable treatment (FET), and shortly lays out the main guidelines for ISDS,
such as transparency and quasi-permanent arbitrators.28 Following the
Commission’s Communication, the European Parliament issued its 2011
Resolution29 that, among others, called upon the Commission to include in all
future EU FT(I)As specific clauses laying down the right of the treaty parties to
regulate in the public interest.30 The 2012 leaked draft proposals of the EU
24 C. J. Tams, Procedural Aspects of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: The Emergence of a European Approach,
15 J. World Inv. & Trade 591, 585–611 (2014).
25 See European Commission Communication, supra n. 10. Fns 20–29 also appear in various forms in S.
Gáspár-Szilágyi, Binding Committee Interpretations in the EU’s New Free Trade and Investment Agreements, 2
Eur. Invest. L. Arb. Rev. 90–133 (2017).
26 A. Reinisch, Putting the Pieces Together … an EU Model BIT?, 15 J. World Inv. & Trade 681, 679–704
(2014).
27 See European Commission Communication, supra n. 10, at 5–9 ‘[the] international investment policy
needs to better address investor needs from the planning to the profit stage or from the pre- to the
post-admission stage’. This is slightly counter-balanced with the need to ensure that ‘a common
investment policy should also be guided by the principles and objectives of the Union’s external
action … including the promotion of the rule of law, human rights and sustainable development’.
28 Ibid., at 8–10.
29 European Parliament, Resolution of 6 April 2011 on the Future European International Investment Policy,
P7-TA(2011) 0141, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML
+TA+P7-TA-2011-0141+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN (accessed 9 Apr. 2018).
30 Ibid., point 25.
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Commission for future ISDS provisions31 did not depart from the mainstream
models found in NAFTA, or US and Canadian IIAs. It only provided for ad hoc
tribunals established under various arbitration rules (Article 8); it did not provide for
appellate review, but it did mention the right of the treaty parties to provide binding
interpretations of the agreements (Article 9.2). It also incorporated the UN
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) rules on transparency
(Article 11).
The second period spans roughly from 2013 to late 2016/early 2017. In 2013,
the EU Commission’s approach came under growing pressure from NGOs and
civil society.32 This resulted in the 2014–2015 Public Consultation on ISDS under
TTIP that evidenced a clear split between the business world and civil society as to
the necessity of ISDS.33 Following the backlash from civil society, the EU
Commission (together with the European Parliament) took upon itself the role
to address and possibly solve34 in the new FTIAs some of the major issues35 that
have led to the contestation of IIL and ISDS. This initiative resulted in the famous
November 2015 Proposal for ISDS under TTIP, which in an altered form found
its way into CETA (renegotiated in early 2016), the EU-Vietnam FTA, and the
EU-Singapore Investment Protection Agreement.
Following the 2015 Proposal, the new bilateral FT(I)As introduced signifi-
cant reforms on three different levels: democratic, substantive and procedural.
Looking at the democratic parameters, they include advanced transparency rules
that incorporate and go beyond the UNCITRAL rules on transparency and
allow third party intervention.36 From an institutional/procedural perspective the
FTIAs would set up their own standing ICS with two-tier adjudication, the
investors would not appoint their own arbitrators,37 and it prohibits the ‘double’
31 The document is available at World Trade Online and requires registration, https://insidetrade.com/
daily-news/eu-draft-text-isds-contains-similarities-differences-us-approach. The PDF document con-
sists of three parts in the following order: the June 2012 revised draft of the Commission, the
Commission’s explanations summarizing revisions and the initially leaked May 2012 document. See
also Tams, supra n. 24, fn. 40 (accessed 9 Apr. 2018).
32 European Commission, Fact Sheet. Investment Protection and Investor-to-State Dispute Settlement in EU
agreements (Nov. 2013), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/november/tradoc_151916.pdf
(accessed 9 Apr. 2018).
33 European Commission, Online Public Consultation on Investment Protection and Investor-to-State Dispute
Settlement (ISDS) in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), SWD (2015) 3 final,
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/january/tradoc_153044.pdf (accessed 9 Apr. 2018).
34 EU Commission, Investment in TTIP and Beyond – The Path to Reform, Concept Paper (2015), http://
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_153408.PDF (accessed 9 Apr. 2018).
35 See G. Van Harten, Public Statement on the International Investment Regime, http://www.osgoode.yorku.
ca/public-statement-international-investment-regime-31-august-2010/ (accessed 9 Apr. 2018).
36 See S. Gáspár-Szilágyi, Transparency, Investment Protection and the Role of the European Parliament, 2 Eur.
Invest. L. Arb. Rev. 371–411 (2017).
37 The EU-Singapore FTA is the exception, until the EU Commission renegotiates its ISDS provisions
in order to include the new ICS.
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hatting of arbitrators.38 Nevertheless, the new FTIAs, just as the existing Member
State BITs, do not include an ‘exhaustion of local remedies’ rule. Regarding the
substantive parameters, the new FTIAs include more clearly worded provisions on
investment protection, they expressly acknowledge the contracting parties’ right
to regulate,39 and the contracting parties via their membership in treaty commit-
tees retain the power to give binding interpretations of the FTIAs.40
The EU’s assertive approach could/can also be seen on the multilateral level.
The EU Commission decided to join the growing trend of increasing the trans-
parency of ISDS proceedings and became an active participant in the UNCITRAL
working groups that preceded the adoption of the 2013 UNCITRAL
Transparency Rules in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration (UNCITRAL
TR).41 Furthermore, the EU has recently rolled out its plans to set up a
Multilateral Investment Court (MIC), in order to create a more ‘transparent,
coherent and fair’ system of settling investor-state disputes.42 In July 2017,
UNCITRAL agreed to discuss possible multilateral approaches to ISDS43 and in
March 2018, the Council issued the negotiating directives for the MIC.44
One could thus assume that following a somewhat slow and idle start, the EU
is becoming a ‘shaper’ of the international investment regime.45 It is actively
concluding FTAs with reformed investment chapters and ISDS, based on its
own model clauses. Therefore, one could argue that Type A convergence is
happening on the bilateral level through the ‘promotion’ of EU norms, towards
which the IIL norms of the other parties are moving closer to. Furthermore, the
EU is initiating multilateral responses to some of the legitimacy concerns faced by
IIL that can result/have resulted in Type B convergence, towards common IIL
norms partially inspired by EU norms.
I would have fully agreed with these statements in December 2016. At the
beginning of 2018, however, one can argue that the EU’s investment law and
38 CETA, Arts 8.27.4 and 8.28.4; EU-Singapore, Art. 9.28.6; EU-Vietnam, Ch. II, s. 3, Arts 12.4 and
13.7; TTIP Proposal, s. 3, Arts 9.4 and 10.7.
39 CETA, Art. 8.9; TTIP Proposal, s. 3, Art. 2.
40 Gáspár-Szilágyi, supra n. 25.
41 See E. Shirlow, Dawn of a New Era? The UNCITRAL Rules and UN Convention on Transparency in
Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration, 31(3) ICSID Rev. 622–654, 625–626 (2016).
42 EU Commission, DG Trade, The Multilateral Investment Court Project, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1608 (accessed 9 Apr. 2018).
43 EU Commission, State of the Union. A Multilateral Investment Court, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/
docs/2017/september/tradoc_156042.pdf (accessed 9 Apr. 2018).
44 Council of the EU, Negotiating Directives for a Convention Establishing a Multilateral Court for the Settlement
of Investment Disputes (20 Mar. 2018).
45 For a discussion on the role of States in shaping the overall investment law regime, seeM. Langford, D.
Behn & O. K. Fauchald, Tempest in a Teapot? The International Investment Regime and State Backlash, in
The Changing Practices of International Law: Sovereignty, Law and Politics in a Globalising World (T.
Gammeltoft-Hansen & T. E. Aalberts eds, Cambridge University Press 2016).
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policy has entered a third phase, one of possible backtracking from the previous
impetus, an upcoming period laden with hardship, and bleaker prospects for the
convergence of IIL norms. The next sections will elaborate this idea further.
3.2 EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS
Sections 3.2 and 3.3 will elaborate on the final thoughts of section 3.1. Why is it
that one can speak of a third phase of the EU’s investment policy in which the
EU’s role as a shaper of IIL might not fully materialize? What internal and external
factors can contribute to this eventuality?
3.2[a] Multilateralism in International Investment Law
One of the greatest achievements of the EU in IIL and possibly one of the greatest
achievements within this field would be the creation of a MIC. According to the
Commission, such a court ‘should be formed by highly qualified permanent and
full-time judges, completely independent of investors and states’.46 Furthermore,
the MIC would allow either party to appeal the decision and it would be
transparent.47 Thus, the principles that guided the creation of the ICS would
also guide the EU’s proposal for a MIC. Nonetheless, the Commission knows all
too well that the MIC cannot follow the EU’s proposal entirely, because other
international actors would influence the final version.
The problem is not the extent to which the future MIC would follow the
EU’s proposal. Instead, the problem is whether the creation of a MIC is possible at
all. Investment law as a field of international law rests on over 3,000 agreements,
consisting of BITs, preferential trade agreements (PTAs) with investment
chapters,48 and a handful of regional agreements, such as NAFTA or the Energy
Charter Treaty. With all their differences, most IIAs use standards and principles
that nowadays are broadly accepted as appropriate standards for investor-state
relations.49 Nevertheless, multilateral efforts in investment law manifest themselves
differently than bilateral ones. Whilst, specific reciprocity characterizes IIL bilater-
alism, which usually manifests itself in rules that favour the interests of the more
powerful, multilateralism ‘is not about the imposition of rules that create one-sided
46 EU Commission, supra n. 43.
47 Ibid.
48 See M. Usynin & S. Gáspár-Szilágyi, The Growing Tendency of Including Investment Chapters into PTAs,
48 NYIL 267-304 (2017–2018).
49 S. W. Schill, Ordering Paradigms in International Investment Law: Bilateralism – Multilateralism –
Multilateralization, in The Foundations of International Investment Law (Z. Douglas, J. Pauwelyn & J. E.
Viñuales eds, Oxford University Press 2014) [emphasis added].
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benefits for a hegemon to the detriment of several other states’.50 Previous efforts
to create some form of multilateral understanding in investment law, such as the
1998 OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment, all failed. One could argue
that the UNCITRAL TR51 are a testimony to the possibility to reach a multi-
lateral result. However, these rules have a lesser impact than a potential MIC
would have. Furthermore, the Mauritius Convention, on the application of the
UNCITRAL TR to investment treaties concluded before 1 April 2014, is witnes-
sing slow ratification.52
One also needs to look at the broader political context and whether major
players, such as India, China or the US would get on board. Following the
2016 US Presidential elections, the Trump Administration does not have a
favourable attitude towards large trade and investment law initiatives, evidenced
by the US exit from Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the current frozen
negotiations of TTIP. In Asia, India is striving to shed its past practice of being
a rule-taker. Its recent investment law practice includes new investment provi-
sions that are more favourable to the state and evidence broader substantive
coverage than its earlier, western influenced BITs.53 China is also striving to
become a rule-maker and not a rule-taker. Its recent One-Belt-One-Road
initiative would also include its own ISDS mechanism, shaped by Asian-style
dispute settlement.54 This broader political climate would make the creation of
an EU-inspired MIC quite unlikely, since the EU does not hold ‘the monopoly
of normative power’.55
In conclusion, the success of the EU in creating a MIC, inspired by its
own values and norms, could be minimal, given the past multilateral failures to
regulate IIL and the need to compromise in order to meet the demands of
other ambitious partners that are already rule-shapers or are becoming rule-
shapers. Therefore, any type of IIL rule convergence (Type B) on the multi-
lateral level that will be a result of the EU’s actions is still a matter of
speculation
50 Ibid., at 114.
51 Shirlow, supra n. 41.
52 UNCITRAL, Status. UN Convention on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State Arbitration, https://
goo.gl/pyuuUP (accessed 9 Apr. 2018). Thus far, only Canada, Cameroon, Mauritius, and Switzerland
have ratified it. Furthermore, only twenty-two states have signed it, a handful of which are EU
Member States.
53 P. Ranjan, Comparing Investment Provisions in India’s FTAs with India’s Stand-Alone BITs: Contributing to
the Evolution of New Indian BIT Practice, 16 J. World Inv. & Trade, 899–930, 928–929 (2015).
54 V. Bath, ‘One Belt, One Road’ and Chinese Investment, Oxford Business Law Blog (2017), https://
www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2017/01/%E2%80%98one-belt-one-road%E2%80%99-
and-chinese-investment (accessed 9 Apr. 2018).
55 Sicurelli, supra n. 20, at 26.
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3.2[b] Strong vs Weak/Strong Bilateral Parties With/Without Own IIL Norms
In a bilateral setting, one must consider two other factors: the power balance
between the parties, as well as whether both parties have ‘their own’ IIL norms.
The following examples in Table 1 shall illustrate how these two factors could
influence the type of convergence that might occur.
Table 1. Strong vs Weak Bilateral Parties
Party 1 Party 2 Type A Conv Type B Conv
Example 1
Has own norms?
Strong Weak Rather Norm
Imposition
Very low
chances,
‘contagion’
possible
Yes No
Example 2
Has own norms?
Strong Weak High chances Low chances
Yes Yes
Example 3
Has own norms?
Strong Strong Very low chances Possible with
spill over effectsYes Yes
In the first example, a strong party with its own IIL norms is negotiating an
agreement with a weaker party, without its own IIL norms. An example is the
EU-Vietnam FTA in which the EU is the ‘strong’ party,56 with its own model IIL
norms, and Vietnam is the ‘weaker’ party that in previous IIAs has mostly accepted
the IIL norms of other, stronger parties.57 Since Vietnam has no existing model IIL
norms of its own, one could argue that this is mainly58 a situation of ‘norm
imposition’ by the stronger party on the weaker one. When it comes to Type B
convergence, the chances of it occurring are very low, since it is highly unlikely
56 Sicurelli’s research on the perception of the EU as a normative power by Vietnamese elites paints a
more balanced picture. The ‘EU was criticized for the lack of coherence in its trade and developments
policies, its interference in the government’s decisions on politically sensitive issues and its internal
division on human rights clauses’. See Sicurelli, supra n. 20, at 25.
57 Vietnam has concluded BITs with most EU Member States. These are the BITs with France (1994);
Denmark (1994); Italy (1994); Poland (1994); Sweden (1994); Hungary (1995); Netherlands (1995);
Romania (1995); Latvia (1996); Austria (1996); Bulgaria (1998); Germany (1998); Czech Republic
(1998); UK (2002); Lithuania (2003); Finland (2009); Slovakia (2011); Spain (2011). The BITs with
Greece (2008 signed); Estonia (2009 signed) have yet to enter into force. See EU-Vietnam FTA,
Annex (Y).
58 I mentioned ‘mainly’ since some norms in the EU-Vietnam FTA are Vietnam specific, which most
probably Vietnam put forward. E.g. EU Vietnam FTA, Ch. II, s. 1, Art. 3(3) – national treatment
clause specific to Vietnam.
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that the stronger party will be willing to give up its own norms for the sake of
some common norms. However, it could happen that in a future IIA between
Vietnam and another party with similar power levels, Vietnam would use norms
from the EU-Vietnam FTA that were inspired by EU norms.59 This could result in
some form of involuntary diffusion of EU norms (‘contagion’). Furthermore, if the
EU concludes with weaker parties multiple bilateral agreements that are based on
its own norms, then EU norm imposition/export shall occur on a broader scale.
Such is the case for example with US or Canadian IIAs based on their model
agreements.
In the second example a strong party with its own IIL norms is negotiating an
agreement with a weaker party that has its own IIL norms. For example, in the case of
CETA the EU is once again the ‘stronger’ party, with its own IIL norms. However,
Canada as the ‘weaker’ party has previous model IIL norms of its own, in the form of
foreign investment promotion and protection agreements (FIPAs) and the model
FIPA.60 In such a case, the chances of Type A convergence are high, since both
parties have existing norms and the weaker party will more likely follow the norms of
the stronger one. In the case of CETA, Canada was willing to renegotiate the original
2014 version of the agreement in order to include the new EU model ICS. The
chances for Type B convergence are lower, since the stronger party will be less willing
to accept common norms if the weaker one can follow the norms suggested by it.
In the third example a strong party with its own IIL norms is negotiating an
agreement with a strong party that also has its own IIL norms. For example, in the
case of TTIP – the negotiations for which are currently frozen – both the EU and
the US are ‘strong’ parties and both have their own ‘model’ IIL norms. Therefore,
the chances of Type A convergence are quite small, since both parties will want to
include part of their own norms. Thus, one can more or less talk about Type B
convergence in this situation, since existing US and EU IIL norms would converge
towards some form of common norms, provided an agreement is reached.
Furthermore, an important bilateral agreement such as TTIP, between the two
biggest world economies, could have become a vector for global norm distribu-
tion. One excellent example for this is NAFTA and how it became a ‘trendsetter’
for other PTAs with investment chapters.61 However, the possibility for the EU to
59 Governments sometimes rely on the models of other countries, which can have negative or even
disastrous consequences. See T. Allee & M. Elsig, Are the Content of International Treaties Copied-and-
Pasted? Evidence from Preferential Trade Agreements 8, NCCR Working Paper (World Trade Institute,
2016), http://www.wti.org/research/publications/998/are-the-contents-of-international-treaties-cop
ied-and-pasted-unique-evidence-from-preferential-trade-agreements/ (accessed 9 Apr. 2018).
60 See supra n. 9.
61 See F. Fontanelli & G. Bianco, Converging Towards NAFTA: An Analysis of FTA Investment Chapters in
the European Union and the United States, 50 Stan. J. Int’l L. 211–246 (2014); C. Lévesque, Influences on
the Canadian FIPA and the US Model BIT: NAFTA Chapter 11 and Beyond, 44 Can. Y.B. Int’l L. 249–
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become an IIL norm distributor via TTIP is on hold for the foreseeable future.
Even prior to the current US Presidential Administration, both parties were
finding it hard to agree on a commonly accepted investment chapter. Now,
following the freezing of negotiations and the US’ backtracking from major
international economic agreements, the likelihood of some form of global norm
distribution and norm convergence via TTIP is very small.
In conclusion, in the bilateral setting the EU has higher chances of exporting,
imposing its own norms on weaker parties that may or may not possess IIL norms
of their own; this can then lead to some level of Type A convergence. However,
when faced with a stronger party with its own norms, the likelihood of Type B
convergence on the bilateral level is higher, provided the parties reach a common
agreement. Moreover, the possibility exists for such bilateral common norms to
spill over to the multilateral field and induce further convergence on the multi-
lateral level.
3.3 INTERNAL CONSTRAINTS
3.3[a] A Discontent Civil Society and Rebellious Regional Parliaments
When acting on the international level, the EU – similarly to states – must also
take into consideration the needs of its domestic constituencies. The EU is a
complex, multi-level machinery. On the vertical axis, the EU and the Member
State level institutions influence the development of common policies and, as the
Wallonian example62 illustrates (infra), the sub-national level has a say as well. On
the horizontal level, the various EU institutions all play a role in policy devel-
opment. Furthermore, one should not forget the input of civil society, NGOs,
academics, etc.
Contrary to the EU’s initial expectations, the inclusion of ISDS in the
new FTIAs has sparked widespread public outrage. One just has to look at the
2015 anti-TTIP protests in Berlin,63 the open letter of over a hundred law
professors against ISDS under the proposed TTIP,64 the rejection of ISDS by
298 (2006); W. Alschner et al., Text-as-Data Analysis of Preferential Trade Agreements: Mapping the PTA
Landscape 5, UNCTAD Research Paper, UNCTAD/SER.RP/2017/5 (2017), http://unctad.org/en/
pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=1838 (accessed 9 Apr. 2018). These authors conclude
that many South-South PTAs also included NAFTA language.
62 S. Marks & C. Oliver, Belgium’s Wallons Cave on EU-Canada Trade Deal, Politico (27 Oct. 2016), goo.
gl/5loNb5 (accessed 9 Apr. 2018).
63 The idea of ISDS was met with protests all around Europe, most importantly the massive rally in
Berlin that gathered 250,000 people. See C. Johnston, Berlin Anti-TTIP Trade Deal Protest Attracts
Hundreds of Thousands, The Guardian (Berlin 10 Oct. 2015), goo.gl/oTKmHd (accessed 9 Apr. 2018).
64 Legal Statement on Investment Protection and Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in TTIP and
CETA (Oct. 2016), goo.gl/nIXCcs (accessed 9 Apr. 2018).
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civil society during the EU Commission’s 2015 public consultation,65 or the
attempted ‘sabotage’ of the signature of CETA by the regional parliament of
Wallonia.
The pressure coming from civil society in the end resulted in a reformed
ICS that was subsequently included into CETA, even if the negotiations had
ended and the parties had already agreed on a final text. This of course means
that civil society only obtained a partial win; ISDS is still included in the new
FTIAs with Canada, Vietnam and Singapore – albeit in a reformed way – and
the EU can disseminate its new model ICS via these agreements.
One must not forget, however, the pressure that civil society can still put
on Member State and/or regional governments to not conclude or ratify the
new ‘mixed’ FTIAs. Three examples come to mind. In Germany, thousands of
members of the German civil society initiated collective complaints before the
German Federal Constitutional Court, concerning the ratification of CETA.66
The final decision of the German Court is still pending, but one of the
preliminary decisions could lead to ‘potential subsequent difficulties’ in delimit-
ing the trade competences between the EU and its Member States.67 In France,
a large number of Members of the National Assembly asked the Conseil
Constitutionnel to decide whether some of the provisions of CETA were
unconstitutional. The Conseil ruled that CETA did not contain any unconstitu-
tional clauses.68 The most well-known example is the Wallonian refusal to
ratify CETA; the regional entity conditioned their approval of the agreement
by having Belgium request an Opinion (1/17) from the Court of Justice on
whether the ISDS mechanism under CETA is compatible with the EU
Treaties, including fundamental rights.69
In conclusion, before the EU can become an IIL norm promoter, it first has to
make sure that the new trade and investment agreements it seeks to conclude can/
will be ratified.
65 European Commission, supra n. 33.
66 See J. Miéral, The CETA, the German Federal Constitutional Court and the Distribution of Competences
Between the EU and Its Member States, http://rsiblog.blogactiv.eu/2017/11/07/the-ceta-the-german-
federal-constitutional-court-and-the-distribution-of-competences-between-the-eu-and-its-member-
states/ (accessed 9 Apr. 2018).
67 Ibid.
68 Conseil Constitutionnel, Decision No. 2017-749 DC of 31 July 2017, http://www.conseil-constitu
tionnel.fr/conseil-constitutionnel/francais/les-decisions/acces-par-date/decisions-depuis-1959/2017/
2017-749-dc/version-en-anglais.149908.html (English version, accessed 9 Apr. 2018).
69 See Kingdom of Belgium, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, Minister
Reynders Submits Request for Opinion on CETA (6 Sept. 2017), registered as Opinion 1/17, https://
diplomatie.belgium.be/en/newsroom/news/2017/minister_reynders_submits_request_opinion_ceta
(accessed 9 Apr. 2018).
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3.3[b] The Court of Justice Might Have the Final Word
The Court of Justice is a crucial internal player one cannot neglect. In 2017 and
2018 the Court brought several important changes that will affect the EU’s
investment law and policy, and its capacity to dissipate its norms externally.
First, the Full Court delivered its much-awaited Opinion 2/15 on whether the
EU-Singapore FTIA should be concluded by the EU alone or together with its
Member States, in the form of a mixed agreement. Even though the Court of
Justice in the end opted for mixity, it greatly clarified the EU’s external compe-
tences when concluding agreements covered by the CCP. Whilst it held that non-
direct foreign investment and ISDS fell under shared competences, the Court
greatly expanded the EU’s exclusive external competences over all forms of
services, public procurement, intellectual property, sustainable development and
competition law.70 The Court also stipulated in several paragraphs that because
parts of the EU-Singapore FTA fell under shared competences, it could not be
approved ‘by the European Union alone’.71 This made some academics wonder72
whether these paragraphs meant the end of ‘facultative mixity’, in the sense that
the Member States had to participate in the conclusion of a trade agreement that
included non-direct foreign investment and ISDS. Furthermore, Opinion 2/15
most probably prompted the Commission to pursue future trade agreements with-
out investment chapters.73
Shortly after, in Germany v. Council (OTIF), the Court clarified that its
aforementioned Opinion 2/15 stipulations were specific to the facts of that case.74
This suggests that the Court did not wish to impose mandatory mixity if part of an
agreement falls under shared competence.75 Thus, technically, the EU could
conclude a trade agreement with investment protection and ISDS, by itself, without
the participation of the Member States. However, the likelihood that the Member
States would reach a political consensus to this end is quite low and they would
most certainly want to participate in the conclusion of trade agreements with
investment chapters.
70 CJEU Opinion 2/15, EU-Singapore FTA [2017] EU:C:2017:376. See Usynin & Gáspár-Szilágyi, supra
n. 48.
71 Ibid., paras 244, 282, 304.
72 L. Ankersmit, Opinion 2/15 and the Future of ISDS and Mixity, http://europeanlawblog.eu/2017/05/
18/opinion-215-and-the-future-of-mixity-and-isds/ (accessed 9 Apr. 2018).
73 S. Gáspár-Szilágyi, A Follow-up to the EU Commission’s Decision to ‘Split’ Trade and Investment Protection,
http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2017/09/guest-post-a-follow-up-to-the-eu-commis
sions-decision-to-split-trade-and-investment-protection.html (accessed 9 Apr. 2018). Investment pro-
tection was also removed from the EU-Japan FTA.
74 CJEU, Council v. Germany (OTIF) [2017] EU:C:2017:935.
75 H. Lenk & S. Gáspár-Szilágyi, Case C-600/14 Germany v. Council (OTIF). More Clarity over ‘Facultative
Mixity’?, http://europeanlawblog.eu/2017/12/11/case-c-60014-germany-v-council-otif-more-
clarity-over-facultative-mixity/ (accessed 9 Apr. 2018).
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These two recent cases have important implications for the possibility of the
EU to disseminate its own IIL norms, which in turn affects whether the EU can
induce some form of normative convergence. If the EU opts to conclude a far-
reaching trade agreement without investment protection, then it can conclude the
agreement as a sole-EU agreement, without the participation of Member States.
The removal of the Member States and their regions from the ratification process
will increase the chances of these agreements entering into force and the EU
disseminating its norms. Nonetheless, these agreements would predominantly
disseminate trade specific rules, not rules specific to IIL – such as investment
protection standards or ISDS – since they would not include provisions on invest-
ment protection and ISDS. Thus, the EU would not be able to influence IIL
norms via sole-EU trade agreements.
Furthermore, whilst the OTIF case seems to suggest that the EU can
conclude a trade agreement with an investment chapter by itself – thus increas-
ing the chances of a swift ratification of the agreement – it is unlikely that the
Member States will agree to this. Thus, Member States and their regional
parliaments would also need to ratify these agreements, prolonging or possibly
blocking the ratification process. In other words, the dissemination of EU
inspired IIL norms would be hindered.
Second, in March 2018 the Grand Chamber delivered its Achmea
judgment76 in which it held that Articles 344 and 267 TFEU preclude inves-
tor-state arbitration, ‘such as’ the one under the Netherlands-Slovak intra-EU
BIT. In other words, investor state arbitration under intra-EU BITs is incom-
patible with EU law. Relying on Opinion 2/13, the Court argued that such
tribunals affect the autonomy of the EU legal order, the principles of mutual
trust and sincere cooperation, as well as the need to ensure the uniform and
effective interpretation of EU law. These arguments make it highly likely that
other ISDS mechanisms, such as the ICS under CETA, the MIC, and investor-
state tribunals under existing Member State BITs, will also be incompatible
with EU law.77 Furthermore, if the Court decides that the ICS under CETA is
incompatible78 with the EU Treaties and fundamental rights, then this will
surely undermine the EU’s future attempts to conclude trade agreements that
include bilateral ICSs or a future MIC.
76 CJEU, Slowakische Republik v. Achmea BV [2018] EU:C:2018:158.
77 S. Gáspár-Szilágyi, It is Not Just About Investor-State Arbitration. A Look at Case C-284/16, Achmea BV,
3(1) European Papers 357-373 (2018). http://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2018/03/guest-
post-the-cjeu-strikes-again-in-achmea-is-this-the-end-of-investor-state-arbitration-under-intr.html
(accessed 9 Apr. 2018).
78 S. Gáspár-Szilágyi, A Standing Investment Court Under TTIP from the Perspective of the CJEU, 17(5) J.
World Inv. & Trade 701–742 (2016).
QUO VADIS EU INVESTMENT LAW AND POLICY? 185
In conclusion, the recent (and future) developments in the Court of Justice’s
case law have the potential to seriously affect the EU’s investment policy and its
capacity to promote its IIL norms externally.
4 CONCLUSIONS
This article is meant to contribute to research in three ways. First, it aimed to
contribute to the existing discussion on the ways in which the EU can export its
norms externally. Second, the article also tried to provide a conceptual understanding
of the often used term of ‘convergence’ and how the EU might induce some level of
convergence of IIL norms, be it by the norms of other states moving towards EU
norms or by putting forward commonly accepted norms that were influenced by its
own norms. Third, it also meant to highlight the importance of looking at the EU’s
normative power in specific fields and not just broadly. Just because the EU might
exert some form of normative force in bilateral trade or association agreements, does
not yet mean that the EU will also be able to exert such force in IIL.
The article also has a sceptical undertone as to whether the EU can become an IIL
norm promoter or contributor and whether it can induce some level of convergence
of IIL norms. Whilst the possibility is there, the multilateral and diffused nature of
investment law, the presence of strong international actors with their own agendas, the
domestic contestation of ISDS, and the important role of the Court of Justice might
hamper the EU’s attempt to become a major influencer of IIL norms.
In light of these, the first question the Commission needs to ask itself is what areas of
IIL can it influence. IIL is not just ISDS and the setting up of a permanent investment
court; the UNCITRAL Transparency Rules and the Mauritius Convention are exam-
ples of improvements in investment law that can be achieved on the multilateral level
with EU input. Efforts to more clearly draft investment protection standards can be
another example. The second question is the more difficult one: how to bring about
new changes and influence IIL norms? If themore immediate goal is to reform ISDS, the
best advice is to wait for the outcome of Opinion 1/17, which will clarify the Court of
Justice’s attitude towards the ICS. Due to the contentious nature of ISDS, new trade
agreements (see the negotiations with Australia, New Zeeland, or Japan) should not
include investment chapters, so as not to jeopardize the overall trade agreement. Instead,
‘anchor’ clauses should be included in the trade agreements to pursue future agreements
on investment protection,79 once the picture is clearer internally. In case the Court of
Justice will opt for the incompatibility of the CETA ICSwith EU law, the EU could still
influence IIL norms, either bilaterally or multilaterally, by proposing alternatives to
investor-state arbitration that might be more easily acceptable internally and externally.
79 Usynin & Gáspár-Szilágyi, supra n. 48, at 295.
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